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McDonald: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. DIVORCE
A. Physicai Cruelty
Brown v. Brown1 involved an appeal from a decree of the
Richland County Court granting a divorce to the husband on
the ground of physical cruelty. Though the marriage had
been a discordant one from the beginning, the husband alleged
only two instances of cruelty by his wife, both of which
were largely unsubstantiated and strongly rebutted by her
testimony. In determining that the evidence was insufficient
to support the decree, the supreme court resolved no new
issues of law but reaffirmed the well settled rule that physical
cruelty under the statute2 must be "such a course of physical
treatment as endangers life, limb or health, and renders cohabitation unsafe. ' 3 The complaining spouse must establish
this conduct by a preponderance of the evidence and unless
the circumstances are unusual, the allegations should be
corroborated. 4 In its decision the court noted that it was
very unlikely that the husky husband was put in fear of
his life by the wife,5 especially since his own testimony revealed that he could have safely walked away from each
encounter. The court was confident that the incidents complained of were mutually provoked and that the retaliatory
acts of each spouse were not disproportionate to the conduct
of the other. 6
B. Condonation
Langston v. Langston7 was an action for divorce commenced by the husband in February 1965 on the ground of
adultery. By an amended answer, filed eight months later,
1. 250 S.C. 114, 156 S.E.2d 641 (1967).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962).

3. Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 508, 56 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1949).
4. Crowder v. Crowder 246 S.C. 299, 143 S.E.2d 580 (1965); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964).
5. 250 S.C. at 121 156 S.E.2d at 645. It is difficult to prove the existence of fear where a large, healthy husband charges his wife with physical
cruelty. Barstow v. Barstow, 223 S.C. 136, 74 S.E.2d 541 (1953); 1
W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, § 6.18 (2d ed. 1945).
6. See, e.g., Godwin v. Godwin, 245 S.C. 370, 140 S.E.2d 593 (1965);
Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d 119 (1954).
7. 250 S.C. 363, 157 S.E.2d 858 (1967).
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the wife admitted the acts of adultery charged but alleged,
as an affirmative defense, condonation by the husband during the intervening period. The circuit court upheld the
wife's defense, dismissed the complaint, and ordered the
husband to pay child support and alimony. On appeal the
supreme court reversed, holding that the husband's condonation had not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.8
There was a sharp conflict in the testimony of the witnesses
and the parties on the issue of condonation and the court
found, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances,
that the testimony of the husband was by far the most
credible. The award of alimony was automatically reversed
since there can be no award of alimony to a spouse divorced
on grounds of adultery.9 The appeal also questioned the
propriety of granting primary child custody and certain
items of property to the wife. The court found no error in
the custody award on the grounds that the wife had been
a good mother to the children since the action was begun
and there was no evidence that the existing arrangement was
detrimental to the parties or the children.
C. Alimony
In Blakely v. Blakely 0 the wife was granted a divorce
on grounds of physical cruelty and awarded alimony in the
sum of $1,200 to be paid over a twelve month period. Some
time later and before any payments were made, the husband
sought relief from the award, alleging a change of conditions.
After a hearing the court reaffirmed the total amount but
8. S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 4 gives the supreme court power in equity cases
to review findings of fact as well as law. This section reads in part:
And said court shall have appellate jurisdiction only in cases
of chancery, and in such appeals they shall review the findings
of fact as well as the law, except in chancery cases where the
facts are settled by a jury and the verdict not set aside, and
shall constitute a court for the correction of errors at law under
such regulations as the General Assembly may by law prescribe.
Following what appears to be a self-imposed limitation, our court has
frequently held that in cases where findings of fact have been made by
a master or referee and concurred in by the circuit court, such findings
will not be disturbed on appeal unless they appear to be without evidentiary
support or are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Oswald v. Oswald, 230 S.C. 299, 95 S.E.2d 493 (1956). Where there have
been no concurrent findings of fact, it is the duty of the court to decide
issues of fact according to its own view of the weight of the evidence.
E.g., McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964);
Harvey v. Harvey, 230 S.C. 457, 96 S.E.2d 469 (1957).
9. S.C. CoDU ANN. § 20-113 (1962).
10. 249 S.C. 623, 155 S.E.2d 857 (1967).
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modified the order to allow for payments over a twenty-two
month period. The wife alleged error and appealed from
the modification. At the time of the divorce both parties
were gainfully employed, and their respective salaries were
nearly equal. The wife, however, had applied for a leave of
absence from her work for one year in order to continue
her education. It was clear that the award of alimony was
made in light of these circumstances. When the case reached
the supreme court the wife had completed her year of study
and had made plans to return to work. It was conceded on
argument that she was not concerned about the manner or
term of months over which the payments were to be made,
but rather was fearful that the husband would seek further
relief when she returned to work. Thus, the real -question
was whether the award was such as to be subject to future
modification. Deciding from the record that both lower court
decrees regarded the award as one in gross, payable in installments, the court cited the general rule that in gross or
lump sum awards are not subject to modification when the
power to amend has not been reserved. 1 The court held
that this rule was clearly applicable to the facts in this case
and that errors, if any, in the modification decree were no
longer material nor prejudicial to the appellant wife.
D. Visitation Rights
Grimsley v. Grimsley' 2 involved the question of visitation
rights of a father following a divorce decree and child custody
award to the mother. Alleging that the mother was interfering with his rights under the order, the father petitioned
for relief. The mother answered requesting, for the welfare
of the child, that his visitation rights be eliminated or at
least curtailed. Her case revealed that since the divorce
the father had persistently attempted to reestablish the marriage and had frequently used the child as a pawn to achieve
that end. As a part of this approach he instructed the child
in his belief that divorce was wrong and that the mother
was committing a sin by remaining separated from him. In
upholding the order of the trial judge, which continued the
father's visitation rights but reduced the period from once
each week to once every other week, the supreme court re11. 24 Ax. JUi. 2d Divorce and Separation § 668 (1966).
12. 250 S.C. 889, 158 S.E.2d 197 (1967).
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peated the rule that such orders will not be disturbed unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 13 Though obviously displeased with some aspects of the father's conduct,
the court felt that the trial judge had acted in the best
interest of the parties and expressed confidence that the
lower court, through its continuing jurisdiction over the
matter, would issue whatever orders might be necessary in
the future to protect the welfare of the child.
E. Default
The defendant wife in Lanier v. Lanier 4 was served with
the summons and complaint on January 6, 1967, but failed
to answer within the time allowed. Shortly thereafter she
filed a verified petition in which she stated as her excuse for not answering that she and her husband had resumed cohabitation on January 22 and remained together
until January 28, 1967. In July 1967 the husband filed a
petition denying these allegations and praying that his wife
be found in default. In addition, his petition stated that the
parties had lived together in an attempt at reconciliation but
that this occurred between May 25 and June 8, 1967, at
which time the wife absconded with the children in violation
of a previous court order granting him exclusive custody.
In denying the wife's petition and declaring her to be in
default, the lower court was strongly influenced by this latter
fact, stating that although under ordinary circumstances her
motion should be granted, her conduct with the children removed her from "any further consideration." The supreme
court reversed, stating that the order failed to recognize
several controlling principles of law. In this instance the
wife alleged a meritorious defense and a valid excuse for not
answering, which is all that is necessary to obtain relief. 15
Although the defense of condonation is an affirmative defense which should be pleaded, the court has a duty to preserve marriages and this duty outweighs the procedural
rights of the parties. Default judgments are not favored
in divorce actions; they will be re-opened more readily than
13. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965).
14. 160 S.E.2d 558 (S.C. 1968).
15. Jenkins v. Jones, 208 S.C. 421, 38 S.E.2d 255 (1946) ; S.C.
§ 10-1213 (1962).
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in other cases, and when there is evidence of condonation the
divorce will be denied.' 6 Here both parties presented evidence
of condonation, and that evidence should have been fully
explored by the lower court.
II. SEPARATE SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE

In Welch V. Welch 17 an action for separate support and
maintenance was heard by a special referee.

The referee

resolved all issues in favor of the petitioning wife and recommended that the husband be required to pay $750 per month
for her support. The circuit court affirmed all of the findings
and adopted the referee's report as its judgment. The husband's appeal principally challenged the finding that his wife
was, in fact, entitled to separate maintenance, there being
no specific exception to the amount awarded. The evidence
in the record clearly established a course of conduct by the
husband which justified an award to the wife and the supreme court agreed that she was entitled to judgment. However, there was also evidence that for a period of several
years prior to the action the wife had customarily or habitually consumed alcoholic liquors and on occasion had indulged excessively. The supreme court found that while
this fault did not contribute to the marital discord sufficiently
to bar her right to separate maintenance,' it was nevertheless extremely inconsiderate since the husband had been
a problem drinker prior to 1955. The lower court award was
based on the finding that the wife was wholly without fault.
The supreme court held that the wife's drinking habit should
have been considered in determining the amount of the
award 5 and that $750 per month, which was more than half
of the husband's disposable income, was unduly liberal in
view of the wife's fault. The case was remanded to the
circuit court for a rehearing as to the amount the husband
should be required to pay.
16. Holliday v. Holliday, 235 S.C. 246, 111 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Grant v.
Grant, 233 S.C. 433, 105 S.E.2d 523 (1958).
17. 250 S.C. 264, 157 S.E.2d 249 (1967).
18. As to what conduct on the part of the wife will bar her from separate maintenance and support see Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d
119 (1954) ; 3 W. NELSON, DrVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 32.21 (2d ed. 1945).
19. As to what faults are considered in determining the amount of the
award see Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 466, 501-02 (1950).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

1968]

South
CarolinaRELATIONS
Law Review, Vol.
20, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
DOMESTIC
SURVEYED

IIL IADOPTION
2 0 was an
Wold v. Funderburg
action to invalidate an adoption decree rendered in 1964 by the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, a court of general jurisdiction. By
this decree the defendants, Louis and Myrtis Funderburg,
had become the adoptive parents of the two minor children
of the plaintiff Donna Wold and her divorced husband. In
1966 Donna Wold brought an action in the same Georgia
court requesting that the decree be set aside on the ground
that she had not consented to the adoption. A jury returned
a verdict against her. Thereafter the Funderburgs moved to
South Carolina and the present action was brought in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County.
The minor children and the plaintiff's former husband were
joined as defendants. In her complaint the plaintiff again
alleged that she did not consent to the adoption, or if she
did consent, her consenting signature was procured by fraud.
In addition she alleged that her former husband had never
consented to the adoption and that his signature on the adoption papers had been forged. The Funderburgs answered
with a general denial and raised the plaintiff's first action
in Georgia as a bar by way of res judicata. The former
husband, however, filed an answer in which he joined in
the plaintiff's prayer and alleged that his signature had in
fact been forged. After hearing the evidence the trial judge
found that the husband was never made a party to the adoption and that his signature had been forged, and accordingly
declared the Georgia decree to be null and void. On appeal
the adopting parents did not question the ruling on the merits
of the case but presented two purely legal questions: (1) Did
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have jurisdiction
of the subject matter? (2) Was the plaintiff barred by the
adverse judgment of the Georgia court by way of res judicata?
The act which created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Aiken County conferred upon that body all of the
powers possessed by the circuit courts in actions involving
child custody and adoption.1 Accordingly, the supreme court
held that although the Aiken court and the Georgia court
are not equal in all respects, they are equal insofar as
questions of adoption are concerned and the domestic rela-

20. 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967).
21. S.C. CODE AN. § 15-1222 (1962).
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tions court had full jurisdiction over the issues presented.
Since the order of the trial court was based on the finding
that the husband's signature was forged, its refusal to give
full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment and decree was
proper.2 2 In answering the question concerning the bar by
res judicata the court found that two basic requirements 28
for its application were not met. Neither the father nor the
minor children were parties in the Georgia suit nor was the
issue of the father's signature raised in that action.
IV. PARENT AND CHILD
Gunn v. Rollins24 presented the court with what appears
to have been a novel question in South Carolina. An action
was brought by two unemancipated minors against the administrator of their stepfather's estate for personal injuries
received in an automobile accident while the stepfather was
driving. In answering this complaint the administrator alleged that although the decedent was neither the natural
nor adoptive father of the minors, he was their stepfather
and that all had lived together in the same household and
voluntarily assumed the relationship of parent and child. It
was alleged that as a result of this relationship the stepfather stood in loco parentis to the minors and that an action
cannot be maintained against one who stands in loco parentis
to the plaintiff. It is well settled in South Carolina that an
unemancipated minor has no right of action against his
parent for personal injuries caused by a parent's negligence,
recklessness, willfulness or wantonness. 25 Urging that the
relationship between the parties did not fall within the scope
of this rule, the plaintiffs demurred to that part of the answer.
The lower court sustained the demurrers and defendant administrator appealed. The supreme court turned to decisions
22. A judgment may be collaterally attacked and declared void when
fraud has been practiced in securing jurisdiction or obtaining judgment.
49 C.J.S. Judgments § 434 (1947).
23. The essential elements for the application of r'es Judicata as stated
in the South Carolina decisions are: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity
of subject matter; (3) adjudication in the former suit of the precise question raised in the second. E.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d
622 (1949) ; Reed v. Lemacks, 207 S.C. 137, 35 S.E.2d 34 (1945); Nelson
v. Parson, 187 S.C. 478, 198 S.E. 401 (1938).
24. 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967).
25. Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Maxey v.
Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C.
28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956) ; Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930).
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from other jurisdictions 26 and found it to be a general rule
that, in the absence of a statute allowing it, an unemancipated minor has no right of action against a stepparent
who stands in loco parentis to the minor. Our supreme court
adopted this position and reversed the decision of the lower
court.
C.E. MCDoN ALD, JR.

26. Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Bricault v.
Deveau, 21 Conn. Supp. 486, 157 A.2d 604 (1960) ; London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Rutkowski v.
Wasko, 286 App. Div. 327, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955); Bingler v. Hopper,
336 Pa. 58, 7 A.2d 351 (1939).
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